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In order to offset American competition, European players in the aeronautical industry have had
to change the manner in which they think of and apply their trade, moving from a weaponry
logic approach to one based on market logic.  This change is most notably the result of the
decision taken by GIE AIRBUS to impose the new rules of market logic onto its partners, one
of which is AEROSPATIALE.  As a result of this decision, AEROSPATIALE has modifed
its system of territorial administration into one of subcontractual relationships, constituting a
system of a-territorial  suppliers.    This  paper presents  an  institutionalist  overview of  these
changes, applying the theory  of instituional dynamics and emphasising the power relationships
in this industry.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last twenty years, interactions between the Aeronautical Branch of AEROSPATIALE
and  its  subcontractors  have  evolved  radically.    From  a  system  of  fragmented  regional
subcontractors centered around AEROSPATIALE establishments, a network of businesses,
much reduced in number and characterised by stronger links and a withdrawal from the notion
of territorial boundaries, has been formed under the aegis of a principal contractor. This paper
examines the reasons behind such upheavals and, in particular, how the principal contractor has
managed to impose such changes and why.
In  answering  these questions,  this  paper focuses  both  on  the  market  and  non-market
interactions between the economic players. In order to fully understand the reasons behind these
players’ behaviour, it is necessary to take account of the principles of non-market interaction.
Institutionalists consider that the coordination of economic activity is not solely due to price
mediation, but results also from institutions. This concept seeks to point out the role of non-
market mechanisms of interaction on economic behaviours. However, this type of analysis of
institutions is not sufficient:  in  addition,  it is  necessary to  adopt an  evolutionist  vision  of
institutions. Indeed, economic problems are constantly evolving and challenge the established
order of behaviours. For the American institutionalists, the object of the economy is thus not to
know how institutions and behaviours stabilise themselves, but how  they evolve (Dufourt,
1995). This theory is in fact centred around the evolution of social systems and processes,
studying both learning and power mechanisms (COREI, 1995). In this paper we will focus our
attention more particularly  on  power  mechanisms.  As  these apply to  interactions  between
principal contractors and their subcontractors,  the notion of  power  is  central.  At  least one
theory, that of American institutionalism, implicates power imbalances between players as the
major factor in their changing behaviour. This theory is advanced further by Commons through
the notion of conflict. This last approach proposes that institutions themselves provide a setting
for actions  and  thus  one  cannot fully understand the evolution  of  behaviour without first
understanding the role played by these institutions, not only as to how they influence economic
behaviour, but more importantly in understanding the actual processes underlying institutional
change itself.
In order to identify these processes, as institutions and behaviour evolve hand in hand, this
paper proposes,  as  a  useful  starting point, to  examine  the  distinction  between  the  terms
institution and organisation, in order to then define institutional change. These definitions will
subsequently be applied to the evolution of the relationship between AEROSPATIALE and its
major subcontractors. This paper hopes to show that the evolution is the result  of  the role
played by GIE AIRBUS in altering the mindset of the AEROSPATIALE group. Finally, this
paper will describe the effect this institutional change has had on AEROSPATIALE’s method
of  local  administration.  It  must  be  pointed out  that the term  ‘local’  here has  no  defined3
boundaries and is to be determined by reference to businesses established in a territory and/or
an a-territorial network.
1 THE DINSTINCTION BETWEEN INSTITUTION AND ORGANIZATION
Prior to discussing the notion of institutional dynamics, it is first necessary to define the
concept of institution. This is best done by also defining the concept of organisation.    
Quoting from an observation made by Hodgson (1996) there exists a dilemma in the vision
of institutions because sometimes they are a framework of laws - the rules of the game - that
contain the individual acts, and sometimes they themselves are the imprisoned acts. Institutions
are simultaneously objective  structures and  subjective  human  acts.  This  double  definition
obscures the analysis of institutions, though this confusion is reduced by introducing the notion
of organisation. This allows the two dimensions of the collective action to be described: the
institutional  dimension  in  which  players  fix  the  framework  for  their  actions,  and  the
organisational dimension in which players act towards a common objective. In the words of
Bazzoli and Bouabdallah (1993) the idea is that the institution covers the substantial and the
organisation the functional.
1. 1. Institutions as structured groups of representations
American institutionalism considers, following cognitivist developments, that cognition and
action are  clearly  interdependent.  However,  according  to  Varela, cognition  does  not  come
before the action. "Far from being the representation of a pre-given world, [cognition] is the
link between a world and a spirit formed from the history of the various actions that brought
about one’s being in the world" (Varela et al.
1, 1993, p.35). This argument incites us not to
remain  not  at a  single level  of  behaviour, but  to  integrate  cognition.  Thereafter,  from  an
institutionalist viewpoint, players are no longer alone at the center of the analysis, because it is
the knowledge of their representations that permits an understanding of their behaviours.
In effect, during one’s actions, each individual builds him or herself an image of the world, a
representation. The role of this representation is to convert information into knowledge, to give
meaning to the data collected.  Social status  is  entirely  contained  in  this  conversion: if  the
interpretation of data is an individual matter, it is strongly influenced  by  the social context
(Hodgson, 1988). This contributes to the construction of a vision of common reality in a social
group.
The various representations maintained by the individual are not simply juxtaposed one next
to the other. According to cognitive sciences, they are organised as models. As is the case for4
the representations they order, these groups are carried by individuals, but are impregnated by
the collective. They can be manipulated to construct and solve an action issue (Olivier, 1996).
This means that representations guide behaviours, and that knowledge transforms into action.
This  paper  maintains  the  idea  that  these  structured  groups  of  representations  can  be
understood as if they were institutions, thereby adopting a Veblenian perception of institutions.
Indeed, for Veblen, institutions are not entities in themselves, but a group of ideas (COREI,
1995). They are the link between thought and action, in a way the missing  link. Sjöstrand
(1995) adds that institutions are infrastructures of human interaction. They are simultaneously
shared amongst individuals and are therefore social in the same way that representations are. In
this sense, institutions are collective objects
2, a  construction  which  presupposes  periods  of
conflict. They are therefore not objective phenomena, but of mental constructs which play an
essential role as a cognitive framework (Hodgson, 1993; Perrin, 1993; Renault, 1996). They
form a necessary informational support to place our perceptions in order for the realisation of
actions  in  a  complex  economic  environment,  which  is  still  only  partially  known  and
understood.  Institutions  impose  a  social cohesion on  human  action  (Hodgson,  1996)  and
should no longer be considered as simple organisational structures, but as standard models
defining what needs to be done in a society (Hodgson, 1988). Again, cognitivist theorists define
a  role here for  representations,  in  the interpretation  of  information. Institutions  provide  a
meaning to the information that they bring, for these are subjective ideas, or convictions. The
goal, therefore, is to establish a model of behaviour in agreement with this conviction. This
takes place by the production of rules.
1. 2. Functions of institutions: to control conflicts and homogenise behaviours through the
intermediary of rules
One can point out two fundamental functions of institutions: they control conflicts of interest
and social phenomena (Bazzoli and Bouabdallah, 1993), and they construct a social order by
achieving an homogeneity in behaviours. These functions are brought about by the intermediary
action of the rules that make up the identity of institutions (Villeval, 1995), and which form the
bond between the institutional and the organisational dimension of the collective action. They
are of various types, from the most formal to the most informal, from procedures to customs.
Individuals or organisations produce rules according to the institutions they support, so as to
regulate  their conflicts.  Institutions,  in  fixing  rules,  define  a  zone  of  tolerance  in  which
individual or collective behavioural models may be exercised (Hamilton, 1993).
One does not observe only cooperative relationships in  this  process  of  rule production.
Rutherford (1983) recalls that for Commons, rules came about not only from institutions but5
also from power brokers. Conflict is present in this rule production phase as it is  in  other
phases of rule evolution (as will be demonstrated further on in this paper).
Institutions do not, however, function always as constraints or rigidities (Hodgson, 1988).
Rules  also  permit  the homogenisation of  behaviours by  establishing  models.  In  defining
behaviours, rules render them more alike and therefore more predictable. This does not mean
that a rule determines the action, but it offers it a reference point (Dupuy and Kechidi, 1995),
without taking away from the players their capacity for coordination. It intervenes when players
reach their limited cognitive capacities by allowing an economy of knowledge, even  if  this
remains subject to difficulties in interpretation. Rules are presented as "Collective Cognitive
Devices":  they  are  therefore  both  cognitive  and  collective  in  nature  (Favereau,  1989).
Consequently, they provide information to players in addition to their own coordination. This
coordination can take place at the heart of an organisation expressing the intentions of their
individuals, intentions that institutions do not possess (Hodgson, 1996).
1. 3. Organizations, producers of routines
Organisations are social groups created to obtain a set objectives. The coordination of players
engaged in an action occurs as a result of the putting into place “(...) of behaviours particular to
a certain group of persons who conform to them. These persons will identify themselves in the
form of an organisation that is, an entity of social coordination whose boudaries are relatively
simple to define and which functions in an enduring manner to obtain an objective or a group of
objectives shared by economic players who find, in this objective, their reason for belonging to
the  organisation”  (Jayet,  1996,  p.  251).  Collective  action  is  therefore  structured,  with
institutions  providing  the  behavioural  regularity  which  is  essential  for  the  efficiency  of
organisations. In  effect,  “(...)  organisations constitute  a  forum  for  defining  practices  and
strategies of players operating within a body of rules held up by institutions” (Kirat and Lung,
1995, p. 6). Thus, the inherent uncertiainty in all actions is reduced. The criteria of choice and
the field of possibilities are maintained by institutions, with individuals exercising this choice
within organisations. Individuals therefore act in the space provided by the rules and in the
space available in their interpretation.
The primary function of organisations is to put into place problem solving strategies so as to
reach their fixed objectives. This takes place, in some cases, by the production of rules within
the framework set up by their underlying institutions. The organisation possessing the most
power (the key organisation) occupies a position in the power structure which is sanctioned by
the other players. If it holds a strong position, it will attempt to dictate interactions by producing
rules to its advantage. One such example is that of certifying organisations in the civil aviation6
industry which prescribe safety regulations that must be followed for each model of aircraft,
under the penalty of prohibition of flight (and therefore of sale).
These  organisations  then  conduct  the  required  verifications  for  the  granting  of  such
certification: they therefore also generate the routines that allow the rules they promulgate to be
applied. Hodgson (1988) explains, indeed,  that the organisation  with  power  tries to  create
modes of behaviour that are lasting and routine
3. If rules are of a cognitive nature, routines as
such are of an action nature: to follow a rule is thus to apply an ensemble of routines, the rules
becoming operational under the form of concrete actions derived from these routines (Dupuy
and Kechidi, 1995). Therefore, all organisations produce routine behaviours
4 in order to apply
rules.
Institutions, rules and routine behaviours are evolutionary by nature. This dynamic process
is not purely mechanical: it is the product of a human action, modelled and limited by  the
society from which it takes its roots (Wilber and Harrison, 1978).
2  THE  TWO  SOURCES  OF  INSTITUTIONAL  DYNAMICS:
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND RELATIONSHIPS OF POWER
It is the opinion of the authors that change, in the broad sense of the term, can take place on two
different levels: it can affect only routines whose evolution will be restricted by the rules and the
institutions which underlie them, or else affect routines that are not compatible with these rules
and institutions, thereby forcing these rules and institutions to evolve. Change may even directly
affect  the  rules  and  institutions  themselves.  In  the  first  case,  the  dynamics  are  solely
behavioural, in the second and the third case, they will be qualified as institutional. This paper
will address only the last of these situations.
It is possible, from this discussion, to define institutional dynamics in two complementary
ways, according to whether it evolves from the appearance of new issues or from the dynamics
of  power relationships.
The appearance of a new non-mastered technique and, more  generally,  the evolution  of
knowledge that renders behaviours obsolete, is the first source of institutional dynamics. This is
defined here as a process bringing about representations and rules as  a  result of  emerging
technological knowledge or even of new problems.
This brings us back to a Veblenian perspective of institutional change. For Veblen (1899)
institutions are not a dynamic factor of change, the main cause of evolution being technology
which introduces new ways of doing things and of thinking. The source of change is therefore
outside of the institutions. Thus, change is understood as a motivating force of rules issuing
from the emergence of new technological know-how, and of new issues (Bazzoli and Kirat,
1996).7
Nevertheless, to conceive the evolution of knowledge as a unique source of dynamics is
reductionist, because, for many institutionalists, technical change is not the motivating force
behind social and economic change. On the contrary, this change stems, at least partly, from the
dynamics of power relationships. Thus "(...) the  analysis of  institutionalists,  in  taking into
account  that conflicts  and  balances  of  power  between social groups  are  essential  for  the
comprehension of social and economic dynamics, develops a system in which voluntary social
regulation of institutional evolution is a  major  theoretical  and  practical  risk  "  (Bazzoli  and
Dutraive, 1995, p. 52).
This introduction of power into the analysis permits one to highlight:
• mechanisms of institutional inertia. A situation of institutional deadlock  can appear if
individuals  or  social  groups  prove  to  be  incapable  of  establishing  the  rules  and
institutions. The problem is in knowing whether they have the power to impose these
changes, which will be realised only at the price of conflicting tensions with the dominant
institutions. Indeed, problems of incompatibility between the various representations can
occur.  Generally  speaking,  institutional  inertia  is  always  present  as  a  function  of
institutions is to bring about a stabilisation and homogenisation of behaviours. Institutions
open the way for human action as much as they restrain it, in accordance with the set
power structures (Clerc et al., 1995). Thus, institutional dynamics is the result of balances
between conflict and cooperation, and between routine forces and forces of production
innovation (Villeval, 1994);
• the active role given to individuals and to social groups in the evolution of behaviours.
This is an artificial concept of evolution, since this dynamic is mastered by the individuals
or social groups that hold power. It is to Commons (1931) (1934) that one must attribute
the theory that, rather than the metaphor of natural selection used by Veblen, use be made
of the Darwinian idea of artificial selection, thereby integrating human will into the social
sciences (Bazzoli and Kirat, 1996). "Artificial selection  emphasises  the active  role of
individuals, groups and legal  authorities  and  of  conflicts  between groups  of  unequal
power,  which  are considered as  the  major  processes  of  evolutionary  adaptation  of
institutions (...) " (Clerc et al., 1995, p. 202). Institutional dynamics are therefore thought
of as a process of creation, artificial selection and application of institutions and of rules
brought about by power brokers that take pragmatic  decisions in  order  to  obtain the
objectives  they  fix  for  themselves,  by  placing  pressure  on  the  power  structures.
Institutional changes can therefore be brought about by a key organisation imposing its
rules on others.
Finally in this first section, it must be noted that very often the two sources are linked, the
first expanding or restraining the choice of institutions  and  rules  offered to  the holders  of8
power. Innovation has an effect on the range of possibilities, the holders of power on the choice
itself (this could mean, for example, that the holders of power orient innovative effort towards
their own objectives).
In examining a particular case in detail, this paper seeks to illustrate this process of artificial
selection of institutions and rules, a selection realised according to objectives. The evolution of
the relationship between AEROSPATIALE Branche Aéronautique
5 and its subcontractors can
be attributed to the development of the AIRBUS program, which upset the power relationships
between European players in the aeronautic industry. In particular, this paper will examine how
this  affected  the  method  of  "local"  administration  within  the  Toulousian  branch  of
AEROSPATIALE.
3 THE END OF THE SIXTIES: THE LOGIC OF WEAPONRY PREVAILS IN
THE AERONAUTIC SECTOR
3. 1. Weaponry logic...
Players within the aeronautic sector (manufacturers, States, military) perceive this industry as
vital: military considerations dominate, with technology and the role of States being decisive
factors (Gormand, 1993). Aeronautics, at least in France, is symbolic of national independence
and of technological advances.
In this type of representations, the technological aspect uppermost: a good aircraft  is  an
aircraft that performs technically (an example of this being the CONCORDE). Here, the client
buys the product as it is, without his or her requests being taken in account.
This structured ensemble of representations incorporating the role of the State, the influence
of technology and  the lack of  interest  in  respect of  the needs  of  the client  constitutes  an
institution  that  Muller  (1988)  described  as  "weaponry  logic".  AEROSPATIALE’s
transformation away from the logic is what interests us here.
The adoption  of  the institution  of  weaponry  logic by  AEROSPATIALE  and  by  other
players in this sector, led to the establishment of the following rules:
• manufacturers are content to wait for a government decision. The State, as the holder of
power, designates the manufacturer(s) and indicates the characteristics of the aircraft to be
constructed. It takes on the roles of client, financier of programs and shareholder of the
enterprises that build the aircraft;
• the production costs and therefore the price of the aircraft are not essential criteria: the
client pays what it is required. The weaponry logic involves a budgetary-type  rule of
management (possible budget blowouts are covered).9
 3. 2. ... applies to subcontractual relationships
Subcontracting provides a  mechanism  whereby  the principal  contractor  can externalise  the
management of labour: it is an ideal way of adapting the volume of work to the market
6.
In weaponry logic, it is possible to discern several characteristic rules in the subcontractual
relationship:
• quality is unchanging over the course of time, and regardless of the dominant institutions,
due to the security requirements which are characteristic of this industry;
• the influence of the State is such that it obliges  manufacturers to  use  local  industrial
materials;
• one subcontracts only the production of elementary items, according to trade experience.
No expertise is transferred due to the need to maintain total control of the technical know-
how;
• the  price  of  the  subcontracted  work  is  not  a  fundamental  criterion.  The  rule  of
management is budgetary by nature;
• finally, AEROSPATIALE assumes the final responsibility of the product in which the
subcontracted items are integrated, and possesses the industrial property of the ensemble.
In the framework fixed by these rules, a "linear"  scheme  of  routines is  applied  by  the
provider and the receivers of orders:
-1  establishment  of  terms  of  contract  by  AEROSPATIALE:  the  principal
contractor specifies when to work (production period), what work to undertake and
in  what  manner  (approval  procedures,  supply  and  information  networks  and
systems of adapted management, checks on investments made...) (Larré, 1994);
-2  passage  of  orders  as  they  come  without  possible  pre-warning  for  the
subcontractor;
-3 production of items by the subcontractor;
-4 deliveries to the principal contractor;
-5 a posteriori controls carried out by AEROSPATIALE.
Subcontracted parts can be complex without forming a complete system. In most cases,
relationships are not particularly close  because the production focuses  on  elementary  parts
controlled by the group.10
3. 3.  Local  administration at  AEROSPATIALE’s  Toulousian  site
7  using  weaponry  logic:
geographical proximity is uppermost
In weaponry logic, political pressures and regionalism are predominant factors in the choice of
a  local  subcontractor.  The  State  applies  its  territorial  development  policy  through
AEROSPATIALE, a public group. Thus, each site  fragments  its  subcontracting  within its
region of establishment. The site occupies a central place in the organisation of the group and
possesses a genuine autonomy that is expressed notably in political terms. Management  of
subcontractual relationships is performed locally: selection of businesses, signing of contracts...
This type of organisation mirrors the history of AEROSPATIALE itself, punctuated as it has
been by successive fusions of small local aeronautic manufacturers.
The establishment thus has the role of driving force as described by Perroux (1992). It is up
to the sites to be involved in the creation of a geographic proximity. Kirat and Lung (1995)
define  this  to  mean  a  social  construct  produced  by  transportation  and  communication
infrastructures, that consequently exceeds  the simple  physical proximity  (and  therefore  the
notion of distance). In this sense, AEROSPATIALE was already established in this territory
8
with a role to organise this type of contact. It is the encounter between a public group whose
actions extend beyond the logic of costs, and a Toulousian territory centred on  spacial  and
aeronautical activities formed over the course of time
9, that built up a geographical proximity.
4  THE  END  OF  THE  1960s  TO  THE  END  OF  THE  1980s:  THE  AIRBUS
PROGRAM FOUNDS INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS
Institutional dynamics in the French aeronautical industry unfolded in two parts:
• in  the beginning it was  not  fixed by  any  particular  player, and  stemmed  from  the
inefficiency of rules in weaponry logic (cf. first source of institutional dynamics);
• then it was taken up again and fixed by AEROSPATIALE’s key player, GIE AIRBUS,
thus stemming from power relationships (cf. second source of institutional dynamics).
4. 1. Institutions that evolve in response to new issues
Faced with American competition superior in industrial and technological terms, with the size
of European manufacturers being too small, with a high entry price into the market, and with
the failure of the CONCORDE - demonstrating that not taking the needs of the market into11
account is a source of inefficiency - institutions supported by European players evolved in two
directions:
• the need to intensify cooperation in order to provide a common response to American
competition;
• a good aircraft is an aircraft that sells.
Industry  players began to  draw  up  new  rules  according  to  the  preceding  institutional
evolution. These had to bring to their actions a greater commercial and industrial coherence. At
least three new rules were defined:
• cooperations  become  unequal in  order  to  avoid  duplication  and  to  maximise  skills
(industrial coherence);
• produce a simple and inexpensive aircraft that corresponds to the needs of the market in
terms of quality, performance, delivery periods, and costs (commercial coherence). This
brings about a reduction of costs  (notably subcontract  purchases)  and  a  reduction  in
delays;
• finally, to impart a sense of responsibility into the manufacturers in respect of technical
and commercial standards.
It therefore appears necessary for manufacturers to apply these new principles of coherence,
to create GIE AIRBUS.
4. 2. GIE AIRBUS
10 as a key organization, imposes institutional dynamics on its partners
GIE AIRBUS forsook weaponry logic little by little, and moved its frame of reference to focus
on the market (Muller, 1988). This is the second phase of institutional dynamics: GIE, born of
the will of manufacturers, now provides the impetus for institutional dynamics within these
same partners. As a result of its chosen organisational structure, AIRBUS is the  dominant
player that imposes its rules, and has the responsibility for any uncertainty and information in
the industry:
• GIE distributes the industrial load according to the competence of its  partners. These
partners retain the technical control of their responsibilities and of the interface between
elements (industrial coherence). This load distribution has brought about a specialisation
of partners, ensuring power to GIE, which is alone in maintaining a global approach to
difficulties;12
• it has built a unique interface with client companies (commercial coherence): it brings
about commercial prospecting, fixes the sale price of aircraft, assures after-sales service
and flight tests. It therefore possesses a unique cognitive resource, the knowledge of the
market, that serves to increase its power.
GIE makes choices in very complex situations where it is necessary to combine commercial
and technological variables: it is this aptitude that gives it this dominant position in the decision-
making tree (Muller, 1988). Each partner recognises the "market logic" institution as dominant,
which allows for the hierarchical arrangement of the other institutions. However, this is taking
place slowly and has not yet reached its conclusion: there is as yet no rupture between the logics
but rather a hybridisation between the two types of institutions, that of weaponry and that of the
market.
5  END  OF  THE  1980s:  AEROSPATIALE  RATIONALIZES  THE
SUBCONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP
GIE, as the key organisation, puts the new rules into effect via their partners in order to better
respond to the needs of the market. AEROSPATIALE echoed these same constraints on its
subcontractors. From this point on, even if the essence of the subcontractual relationship stayed
the same, the rules that governed it evolved towards the market logic. The term ‘subcontract’
now covers classical-type relationships right through to more elaborate relationships. In these
last cases, the objective of such "global" subcontracting to is seek out enterprises which relate
with AEROSPATIALE in the same manner as this group relates with GIE. The subcontractor
takes the industrial, commercial and financial risks, but the project management falls back on
AEROSPATIALE: in this sense, this is not an equal partnership, but rather a transfer of costs
and risks.
5. 1. The new rules and routines of the subcontracting relationship
AEROSPATIALE applies the  new  rules  of  global subcontracting  that reflect  the rules  of
market logic:
• the group  must  receive  only  the  manufactured  items,  protected,  checked,  ready  to
assemble (Larré, 1994);
• decrease  the  number  of  subcontractors  and  establish  more  stable  and  reliable
relationships;13
• subcontract out complete systems;
• widen the search for subcontractors to include  the entire  country, which  implies  that
AEROSPATIALE  no  longer  assumes  the  role  as  supporter  of  regional  industrial
materials;
• the  subcontractor  must  maintain  a  certain  economic  autonomy,  in  the  sense  that
AEROSPATIALE must not be the only client. This rule is indispensable in ensuring the
viability and dynamism of the subcontracting system, notably in case of a reduction of
orders;
• market logic implies the abandonment of the budgetary rule in favour of the results rule:
meaning an increased pressure on costs, but also a participation in any profits realised
from the success of an aircraft;
• AEROSPATIALE assumes final responsibility for the integrated product and possesses
industrial property in the product.
These rules are, in the end, only an extension of new tasks to traditional subcontracting.
However,  their  application  has  resulted  in  the  implementation  of  new  routines  by
AEROSPATIALE.
Specifically, subcontractors are categorised into two classes:
• the second of these classes refers to the classic subcontracting  by  AEROSPATIALE
already discussed in this paper: one subcontracts a "trade", a specialty. There were 170
such trades in direct contact with AEROSPATIALE Branche Aéronautique in 1993, 80
in 1996, and probably only 60 in 1997. They are due to be phased out at the end of the
A300/A310 program. Moreover, the industrial part of the aircraft (the cell) is diminishing
in favour of the systems part, which is serving to amplify the phenomenon. For this
class, the rules and routines stemming from the weaponry logic continue to be applied;
• the first class of subcontracts refers to the production of parts that call on the expertise of
different trades. It is here that global subcontracting has been implemented. The scheme
for the application of routines in this case becomes:
-1 evaluation and selection of the subcontractor: the quality-control is performed a
priori by AEROSPATIALE. The verification of the subcontractors facilities, the
reliability of its organisation, and the trust that one can place in it, are substituted for
the evaluation of its products (Larré, 1994);
-2 research and development is carried out by the subcontractor. This confers on
them  a  financial  participation  in  the  industrial  program.  There  is  then  the
requirement to find alternatives to State financing, especially for aircraft produced
after the A320. To offset these research and  development costs,  subcontractors14
obtain monopolies over a certain number of aircraft. They can therefore plan future
estimates of their production, with orders no longer being immediate;
-3 "just in time" production of parts by the subcontractor with reduced stock and
batches;
-4 final quality-control of parts performed by the subcontractor;
-5 delivery to the principal contractor. The  go-aheads to  make  the delivery  are
delayed until as late as possible.
This global subcontracting has permitted AEROSPATIALE, in collaboration with efficient
enterprises, to achieve significant gains in productivity. Furthermore, its internal capacities for
research, production and quality-control have not been increased, which is a way of distributing
the problems associated with labour management.
Finally, as will  be  demonstrated, this  new  type of  subcontracting  has  strengthened  the
organisational bonds between enterprises.
5. 2. "Local" administration by AEROSPATIALE using market logic: geographical proximity
declinates
For the second class of subcontractor, geographical proximity continues to play an important
role because it allows  a  better  circulation  of  information and  of  people,  especially  when
subcontractors are not computerized or do not have access to the data banks of the principal
contractor.
In contrast, for the first class of subcontractors, geographical proximity is no longer sought-
after by the group. Indeed, the disengagement of the State from the civil aeronautical sector has
allowed AEROSPATIALE  to  broaden its  search for  subcontractors to  the entire  country,
causing it to abandon its support of local industrial materials. The group seeks to transfer this
role to the first class of subcontractors by linking its contracts for global subcontracting with
incentives  and  commitments  to  employ  second  class  subcontractors.  This  geographical
proximity can sometimes produce negative effects: the principal contractor can get caught up in
social conflicts, or the subcontractor, too accustomed to the presence of the principal contractor,
may not seek to diversify his client and product base as required.
Consequently, geographical proximities that one observes today in the region of Toulouse
are the result of past events and are no longer fostered. The institutional change described in this
paper has modified the method of "local" administration. This rationalisation of relationships
has permitted AEROSPATIALE to construct  an  a-territorial  network  of  subcontractors:  is
exercised  cooperations  that establish the  division  of  resources  between  partners  and  that
produce collective know-how.15
CONCLUSIONS
In  conclusion,  it  is  proposed  to  return  briefly  to  the  consequences,  for  Toulousian
subcontractors, of institutional dynamics. These consequences differ according to whether the
subcontractor is categorised in the first or second class. Subcontractors in the first class become
increasingly specialised, increasing their  know-how  through  training  and  the acceptance  of
greater responsibilities. With their competence and qualification level increased, their relative
autonomy is strengthened. However, the aim of AEROSPATIALE is to subcontract product
with few suppliers, thereby implying a reduction in the number of subcontractors having a
direct link with the group. Many are therefore relegated to the second class of subcontractor,
without having access to the required resources by the principal contractor, often because they
have not known how to meet these demands in time. Institutional dynamics must always face
up to the inertia of those who are subjected to it. However, subcontractors who have understood
the meaning of institutional dynamics, and whose institutions have evolved, have come out
winners. Because a successful adaptation is firstly a change in the institutions being maintained
by the players, it is important in an economy to integrate the notion of institution, as defined in
this paper, so as to demonstrate its role in the success or the failure of enterprises faced with
industrial change.
FOOTNOTES
1  Cited by Olivier (1996).
2  Veblen (cited particularly by Villeval, 1995), defined institutions as "settled habits of thought common
to the generality of men".
3 Thanks to the distinction between institution and organisation, we wish to avoid here the confusion
sometimes made between institutions and stable behaviours. For example, Foster (cited by Waller,
1982) defines institutions as proscribed structures or  prescribed  correlated  behaviours  or  attitudes
largely agreed upon between persons organised to reach a common goal. It is the function of the
institution to establish such behaviours, and not its nature.
4  Behaviours, qualifiers of routines, are defined in five dimensions: they are regular and predictable;
they are automatic; they possess a character that is more or less tacit; they are more or less conscious;
and finally, they reduce the knowledge and deliberations necessary for the action (Egidi et al., 1994).
5  We will use successively in this text the terms Aircraft Division and Branche Aéronautique. The
Aircraft Division took the name Branche Aéronautique following Operational Center reorganization
undertaken in 1995.
6  Subcontracting is considerable in this sector: it represented 10% of all construction in the 1930s, 35%
in the  1950s,  and  at  least  50%  today.  The  B777,  the  most  recent  of  the  BOEING  aircraft,  is
subcontracted to near 70 % of its value. AEROSPATIALE Branche Aéronautique subcontracts 40% its
production (compensations, global subcontracting, classic subcontracting), this level will soon have to
climb to 60%.16
7  The three other sites of Branche Aéronautique are at Méaulte, Saint-Nazaire and Nantes.
8  Concerning establishment in a territory, see for example Gilly and Grossetti (1993).
9  Concerning the history of the setting up of the Toulousian territory, see Grossetti (1995).
10  GIE is composed of four shareholders: French AEROSPATIALE (37.9%), the German DASA (37.9%),
the British BAe (20%) and the Spanish CASA (4.2%).17
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